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Empirical theology is distinguished from practical theology by reference to the views of 
Duncan Forrester and J van der Ven. The nature and historical emergence of theological 
disciplines are considered and related to the social science methods found in van der Ven’s 
account of empirical theology. Such social science methods are congruent with those used in 
natural sciences and therefore in natural theology.  Empirical theology may be variously 
located within the whole enterprise of theology. Yet, it belongs in the theological fold by 
virtue of its relation to natural theology and through the historical trajectory by which the 





Following the case made by Hirst, and supported by cognitive psychology’s work on 
schemata, academic disciplines may be delineated by their characteristic concepts and 
methods.1  Mathematics is inconceivable without the concept of number or the rules by which 
numbers may be manipulated.  Physics is inconceivable without the concepts of mass, energy 
and force, and the methods by which these concepts are determined, related and predicted.  
There may well be relationships between the methods of one academic discipline and another 
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for reasons arising from the nature of knowledge or the structure of the external world.  Yet, 
there will also be methods specific to the concepts within a particular discipline because these 
methods are congruent with those concepts.  The methods applicable to the discipline of 
history, for example the assessment of the bias of original documents, would hardly make 
sense within the discipline of physics. 
 
So, while disciplines may be discrete and concerned with their own internal problems, they 
may be grouped together within larger entities subordinated to general purposes.  These larger 
entities are fields.  For example, education may be described as a field whose general purpose 
is the transmission of worthwhile knowledge to pupils by rational and ethical means.  This 
field may draw upon educational psychology, ethics, philosophically-based distinctions 
between different forms of knowledge, and other elements drawn from political discourse.  
As a field it is too variegated and wide to be reduced to a discipline.  Yet there is sufficient 
coherence among the contributory disciplines for the socially recognised enterprise of 
education to be expressed institutionally. 
 
Practical or empirical theology 
Practical theology can be understood as a field. It is true Forrester describes practical theology 
as ‘an academic discipline’ but his classificatory scheme is only intended to explore how 
historically the various components of theology have been related to each other within the 
university context.2  He does not draw the distinction made here between disciplines and 
fields.  Nor does he draw a sharp distinction between science and other forms of human 
activity.  For him science is simply knowledge systematically obtained rather than knowledge 
obtained by specified methods.  And, where theology (especially in Germanic debate) claimed 
to be a science, it did so in order to justify its place within the university curriculum. What 
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Forrester shows is the way that practical theology has existed within theology since the 
Middle Ages, either implicitly as ‘essentially a devotional exercise’ or explicitly as the last 
stage of theological education.  It is no surprise that practical or pastoral theology was 
recognised in Tübingen as early as 1794. 
 
For Forrester, and for the theologians he briefly surveys (Schleiermacher, Barth, Rahner, 
Hiltner, Pannenberg), a discipline is rigorous, careful and systematic.  It is a discipline 
precisely because it requires intellectual discipline on the part of its practitioners.  
Consequently practical theology, if it is to be a discipline, cannot in Forrester’s words be a 
‘lose amalgam of skills-directed discussions... (and) sloppy thought’ (page ix).  Rather 
practical theology is the application of theologies, whether liberal or conservative, to the 
practical concerns of the church.  So it is not the kind of theology that is carried out that 
defines practical theology.  Nor is the kind of practice that is carried out that defines practical 
theology.  Rather it is the detailed and rigorous combination of these two elements that 
comprise its definition.   
 
A second method of locating empirical theology has emerged through the Dutch University of 
Nijmegen.  Building on the five volume handbook of pastoral theology edited by Karl Rahner 
and others and published in 1964 the faculty of theology at Nijmegen initiated a two-phase 
model of pastoral theology in which the first phase constituted a social-scientific description 
and analysis of pastoral themes and the second phase constituted theological reflection.3  This 
two-phase model was eventually abandoned for three main reasons.  It was thought that 
social-scientific research is inadequate for dealing with pastoral and ecclesiastical problems; 
the method of theological reflection within the second phase was insufficiently defined; the 
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differences between the social sciences and theology in relation to their respective formal 
subjects and, consequently, the paradigms they elicit are too great. 
 
As a result the Nijmegen department of pastoral theology shifted from a multidisciplinary to 
an intradisciplinary approach.  By this they meant that, in general, the methodology of one 
discipline, here the empirical sciences, was adopted by another, in this case (pastoral) 
theology.  So after 1975 theologians began to apply empirical research to the problems and 
issues of pastoral theology in order to describe them from a theological point of view.  The 
justification for this procedure was that theology had always made use of the methods of other 
disciplines for its own purposes.  For instance, philological analysis drawn from elsewhere in 
the academic spectrum had been used to scrutinise canonical texts.  If theology appeared to be 
acting imperialistically, that at least was its regal privilege.   
 
The two-phase process gave way to a multiple process, involving four or five phases.  The 
revised form of practical theology entails theological reflection upon a particular theological 
problem, the translation of this problem into empirical terms, the testing of these terms and, 
finally, a theological evaluation of, and reflection on, the results of the empirical work.  
Theology begins and ends the process.  Conceptualisation and testing which occur in the 
middle are empirical.  By 1985 the intradisciplinary multi-phase approach to pastoral 
theology came to be called ‘empirical theology’. 
 
This nomenclature had been deliberately borrowed from German Protestant theologians in the 
late 1960s who had, in their turn, made use of the writings of the Chicago School from the 
period immediately following the First World War.  Empirical methods had been used for the 
analysis of situations requiring ethical judgments and in relation to the interface between 
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clinical and pastoral work.  According to van der Ven the relationship that emerged in United 
States between empirics and a range of disciplines needs to be understood against the 
background of the influence of William James and John Dewey, and even John Locke.4  
 
In the context of this discussion the location of empirical theology within intradisciplinary 
work implies that theological method is not unique to its subject matter.  Theologians are able 
to use social-science methods as a way of theologising.  These methods become theological 
simply because they are in the hands of theologians and because their object is human faith.  
Van der Ven is clear about this.  ‘The direct object of empirical theology is not God but rather 
human experience of God, our communication with him and about him…the very object of 
empirical theology… [is] the quality of the relationship between God and man…the direct 
object of theology must be our experiential knowledge of God…the direct object of theology 
is faith, the indirect object God’.5  Empirical theology can only address God indirectly since 
revelation is embedded in human experience. 
 
What hangs on the distinction between interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary approaches?  If 
an approach is interdisciplinary, then the disciplines of both contributing subjects may be 
brought to bear upon the resultant product.  If it is intradisciplinary, then the decisive issue is 
at the interface between the two disciplines which are, effectively, treated as one.  And they 
are treated as one because theology is not strictly speaking treated as a discipline but rather as 
the Christian community’s tradition of thought and action.  So van der Ven gives clear 
guidance about the application of empirical methods to the conduct of empirical research, 
even to the extent of recommending p values and alpha coefficients, but much less guidance 
about theological reflection and interpretation.   
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The interrelation of theological disciplines 
But how should the different disciplines in theology be related to each other?  Here are two 
ways.  In the first they are arranged in a spectrum such that the different disciplines are placed 
next to each other in approximate order of similarity.  Thus dogmatics might be placed next 
to historical theology on one side and ecclesiology on the other.  These three disciplines are 
related very directly to the church.  On this spectrum would be placed empirical theology and 
it would be seen as a theological discipline carried out on a wide range of theological topics 
and contributing to the whole field of theology.  Connected with all these disciplines would 
be practical theology, for practical theology would be thought of as the application of 
theology of all kinds to the activities of the church in its widest sense.  Practical theology 
would, therefore, be related to dogmatics and empirical theology as much as to biblical 
studies.  It would be the applied element in each discipline and because it is made up of all 
the theological disciplines would constitute a field. 
 
Alternately we could place empirical theology in a position intermediate between all the other 
disciplines and practical theology.  In this sense empirical theology would be seen as largely 
methodological in its distinctiveness.  Its task would be to take the concepts and problems of 
the other theological disciplines and to test and apply them to current populations.  It would 
prepare and re-shape other theological disciplines in readiness for their practical usage within 
the various communities to which theology speaks. 
 
Of course, empirical theology would have considerable difficulty in relating itself to some 
theological disciplines.  Within historical theology there are few if any concepts that can be 
operationalised.  Similarly empirical theology would have no purchase on debate concerning 
the ontology of the Trinity, for example, since the procession of the Holy Spirit is not 
 7 
susceptible to empirical investigation.  Yet, although empirical theology could not contribute 
to the development of these disciplines, it would still be able to contribute to their application 
and formulation.6   
 
Does this arrangement of theological disciplines either in relation to practical theology 
directly or in relation to practical theology through the mediation of empirical theology have 
any implications for the connection of these disciplines one with another?  Can we suggest 
how systematics might be related to biblical studies, for example?  Here it has to be said that 
the main way the different disciplines of theology might relate to each other concerns which 
one is given priority and which ones are used evidentially.  Barth’s Church Dogmatics is a 
systematic work, yet it certainly draws upon biblical and historical theology though the 
discussion drawn from these disciplines is symbolically carried out using a smaller font size.  
The same kind of shifting balance might occur if historical theology were the prime focus of 
the writer.  Here historical doctrines would be discussed and interrelated and the systematic or 
biblical contributions to these doctrines would be contributory and evidential – in a smaller 
font. 
 
Methods of empirical theology 
The location of empirical theology in relation to theology as a whole and its characterisation 
either as interdisciplinary or intradisciplinary have an important bearing on the criteria by 
which work of this kind is assessed.  Kay and Francis distinguish between interdisciplinary 
inquiry in which the content of one discipline is reassessed in the light of another (as when 
chemical reactions might be reassessed in the light of changes at sub-atomic levels registered 
by physics), the amalgamation of two disciplines into one new discipline (as with the 
combination of sociology and psychology into social psychology), and the form of 
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interdisciplinary inquiry in which the practitioners of both disciplines are satisfied that a piece 
of research is valid from their own point of view.7  They argue that only the third form of 
interdisciplinary inquiry is completely satisfactory because it is the most stringent.  It requires 
all valid pieces of work to fulfil two sets of criteria.  They do not specifically discuss 
intradisciplinary work.  Nevertheless, the Nijmegen school’s approach is largely covered by 
putting their first two concepts of interdisciplinary enquiry in sequence.  
 
If Forrester’s looser notion of an academic discipline is accepted, practical theology will be 
systematic and rigorous without necessarily following the canons of any self-conscious 
methodology.  If van der Ven’s notion is accepted, then practical theology is fundamentally 
answerable only to the methodological procedures inherent in social science investigation.  
Granted, this investigation will be handled sensitively and by theologically knowledgeable 
practitioners, but the actual criteria by which work is judged will be empirical rather than 
theological.  This is because in van der Ven’s scheme the process of theological reflection is 
one that is the least answerable to methodological precision.  Although he outlines how 
theological reflection might proceed, the outline has no hard and fast guarantee of quality 
built into it.  Reflection is nebulous.  It is not an activity that appears to have any precise 
outcome or associated procedure. 
 
The operationalisation and testing of theological concepts, in theory, follows the same path as 
is followed whenever any intellectual concepts from any field of discourse are tested.  The 
concept must be translated into operational terms, that is, terms susceptible to empirical 
address.  For instance, pacifism exists as an intellectual construct but, for the purpose of 
empirical work, must be turned into a scale that can be used with human populations.  
Similarly theological ideas and concepts must be translated into scales or norms that can be 
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reached by empirical methods.  Suppose that one wanted to investigate the relationship 
between types of prayer and ideas of God, it would be necessary to devise operational 
variables based upon theologically derived concepts of prayer and of God and then, within 
specified human populations, to explore the relationship between them quantitatively or 
qualitatively.   
 
What is being said here is that empiricism presumes a particular account of human beings and 
their relation to the external world.  Empiricism presumes that human beings derive and 
abstract from the external world internal images and concepts -- indeed this process is 
accounted for in detail within the psychology of Piaget -- and that, conversely, images and 
concepts can be translated into actions within the world from which they ultimately came.  
This philosophical account of the world in which rational observers are distinct from the outer 
physical or social world dates back at least as far as the mind of Descartes.  It presumes, but 
does not insist on, the commensurability of the internal and the external.  It is rational but not 
rationalist.  It can accommodate dialectic but it allows the last word in any argumentation to 
the concrete and measurable.  It assumes that the external is transparently available without 
mediation to all human beings through their sensory apparatus.  It is unable to appeal to any 
principle outside itself when arguments are advanced suggesting that apprehensions of the 
external physical or social worlds are distorted by, for instance, language or other media.  
And, when such arguments are advanced, as when it is asserted that there is no theory-free 
perception, then empiricism can only appeal to the perceptual agreement of numerous 




Empiricism’s philosophical base should not simply be equated with crude reductionism or 
with scientific positivism.  The former usually reduces ideas or explanations to a simple 
material form (e.g. human love is only a series of chemical reactions).  It is found most 
cogently expressed in the work of B F Skinner (1904-90) whose behaviourism scorns the 
reality of mental events and translates complex emotions into observable behaviours.  The 
latter asserts that only a scientific method dependent upon measurement and testing can lead 
to knowledge, and that no other roads to knowledge exist.8  Consequently method, which 
itself can hardly be axiomatically justified, is given a place of pre-eminence.  Empiricism, 
however, belongs to a much larger vision of humanity and certainly has no need to embrace 
reductionism.  It does not need to deny the reality of unobserved entities like the human mind 
or imprecise ones like human emotions.  Likewise empiricism has no need to be positivistic.  
Rather it embraces all that is available to, or deducible from, the human senses. 
 
 
Empirical theology, natural theology and objectivity 
At its simplest natural theology is the theology of the natural world.  It is the theology of the 
universe as it lies around us.  Yet, since this universe has been investigated so successfully by 
the methods of science, and these methods have revolutionised the paradigms by which we 
understand the created order, it is unsurprising that natural theology has been caught up 
within these transformations.  It would be unthinkable now for natural theology to discuss the 
cosmos as if we lived in a heliocentric universe. 
 
The methods of science which characterise physical sciences that probe the furthest corners of 
the created order are in many respects similar to the methods utilised within versions of 
empirical theology.  In each case hypotheses are propounded, tests are initiated, data is 
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recorded, probabilities are assigned and results are discussed.  Van der Ven certainly accepts 
the view of science put forward by Popper, originally in relation to scientific discoveries 
within the physical world, but equally applicable to the social sciences.  In short, these 
proposals entail the imaginative proposal of an hypothesis to explain a problem and the 
operationalisation of the concepts within the hypothesis so that it may be tested.  This testing 
occurs by attempts at falsifying (rather than verifying) the hypothesis and, where falsification 
fails to take place, the hypothesis becomes a theory that is conditionally acceptable.9  The 
better the theory, the wider range of phenomena whose behaviour it explains.   
 
This notion of science has the advantage of embracing continual change.  It is progressive in 
the sense that the knowledge it offers is neither static nor absolute.  It should be apparent at 
this point that the congruence in methods between empirical theology and the natural sciences 
is such as to create a unique relationship with natural theology.  Empirical theology uses 
methods very similar to those used within the natural sciences and to which natural theology 
responds.  For this reason the relationship between empirical theology and natural theology is 
a special one.  Indeed, as is argued below, if natural theology is the theology of the natural 
and physical world, it also makes sense to conceive of natural theology as the theology of the 
social world in which human beings have always lived.  And, as will also be argued below, it 
is a reasonable postulate that, just as the natural world speaks of the creative power of God, so 
also does the social world. 
 
In considering theology as a science, it is necessary to engage with notions of objectivity that 
have been put forward within theological discourse.10  Barth especially discussed at length 
different types of objectivity and distinguishes clearly between a primary objectivity, that is, 
the knowledge of God held by God about himself ‘God is objectively immediate to himself’ 
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and a secondary objectivity because ‘to us’ because ‘he is objectively mediate’  (Church 
Dogmatics [CD], 2, 1, 16).11  For this reason ‘we really know him only in his clothed 
objectivity’ (CD, 2, 1, 16).  So, while it is perfectly true to say that from ‘we have God as an 
object’ (CD, 2, 1, 21), it is also true but God is an object different from other objects because 
grace is required for this apprehension.  ‘Only because God posits himself as the object is 
man posited as the knower of God’ (CD, 2, 1, 22) or, again, ‘his primary and his secondary 
objectivity is objectivity for us, since he himself makes himself into object for us and us into 
knowers of him’ (CD, 2, 1, 23). 
 
In short, Barth argues that, whereas the most perfect objectivity exists in the knowledge that 
God has of himself, a secondary objectivity exists in the knowledge of himself that God gives 
to human beings in grace.  This knowledge is objective rather than subjective and by this 
Barth means that it is true, real, genuine knowledge and not delusional. 
 
The use of the term ‘objective’ in Barth’s vocabulary is related to the notion of an object, 
rather than a procedure by which agreement about perception might be reached.  Objectivity 
appertains to the perception of an object by a subject.  This notion of objectivity is certainly 
thought of as too simple in the scientific and philosophical community where objects are 
themselves problematised.  This occurs most obviously in the physics of atomic and 
subatomic particles.  The particles (e.g. protons, electrons, quarks) are unobservable and 
therefore imperceptible and, where observed by instrumentation, altered by the process of 
observation.12  So, though protons, electrons and quarks are objects, they are not perceived as 
objects in the normal way. 
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The placement of theology among the sciences must be understood as arising from a wish to 
secure the status and value of theological discourse.  Historically it is true theology preceded 
science and its place within the university curriculum was secure from the Middle Ages to the 
Enlightenment.  Theology provided the vision for society as well as an explanation of the way 
of salvation.  It was made compatible with Aristotelian logic by Aquinas who also contributed 
to the integration of Aristotelian ethics with Catholic moral theology in such a way as to 
classify and systematise descriptions of sin and virtue.  To say at any time before the 
Enlightenment that theology was a science would be to offer it no compliment.13  Only after 
scientific knowledge came to be seen as the paradigm of all knowledge (excepting perhaps 
mathematics) would any form of intellectual inquiry seek to emphasise its scientific 
credentials.  So when Barth or Forrester speak about objectivity or, as Torrance does (see 
below), of ‘theological science’ the assertion they are making its to be understood in the light 
of the counter assertion that theology is not scientific in the slightest but is rather a species of 
art. 
 
For, if theology is an art, it is merely a sophisticated means of myth-making for the purpose of 
providing meaning to human aspiration and emotion.14  It belongs with cave paintings and 
Stonehenge as well as with the ubiquitous narratives of origination that have sustained human 
beings in the face of hostile environments and intimations of despair.  It is a means of 
domesticating contingency and inspiring morality.  Yet, despite these grand ends, it is a series 
of pictures, images and stories that can claim no more validity than any product of the 
imagination.  It is, at bottom, arbitrary and metaphorical.  It has been constructed by human 
beings and may be changed by them because its account is non-realist and connects with no 
absolute being or divine authority. 
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In categorising theology as an art or as a science in terms of 21st century terminology one is 
placing it within a large frame of reference that is big enough to contain numerous academic 
disciplines and fields.  For the purpose of this discussion, and in the context of the 
relationship between empirical theology and its purposes, theology is placed within the 
scientific frame of reference, even if such a placement is coupled with a recognition that 




Natural theology and empiricism 
At its widest extent natural theology deals not only with the external world of the physical 
universe but also with the social world of human beings and the inner space of human psyche.  
Both Rahner and Lonergan in separate ways accept that unrivalled advances in scientific and 
social scientific knowledge are likely to enrich and add value to natural theology.15  Barth 
alone stands opposed to any compromise with natural theology.    
 
Barth’s condemnation of natural theology rests on at least three grounds.  First, natural 
theology presumes a knowledge of God ‘outside God’s revelation in Jesus Christ’ (CD, 2, 1, 
168).  Natural theology appears to offer knowledge of God outside the grace of God.  It 
therefore negates grace and renders it unnecessary.  It attempts to replace the divine work by 
human constructions.  It is dangerous because it provides a substitute for the true knowledge 
of God given in revelation in Jesus Christ. 
 
Second, natural theology in the broad sweep of its historical development led to the demands 
made by the Nazi party in 1933 that Adolf Hitler be recognised as ‘a source of specific new 
 15 
revelation of God’ (CD, 2, 1, 173) whose words took their place beside revelation attested in 
Scripture.  This claim made by the Nazi party followed developments within the 18th century 
when humanism was revived and within the 19th century in the rise of romanticism that led to 
the subsequent ideals of national socialism.  It rested on the assumption that God worked 
within culture and culture was gradually improving in accordance with the divine workings so 
as to culminate in what might be identified as the kingdom of God.  For this reason there was 
an overall consonance between revelation and the social, the religious, the national and 
perhaps even the Germanic. It was the word ‘and’ to which Barth so vigorously objected.  
Nothing should be put alongside revelation, for revelation belongs in a class of its own 
needing neither social nor religious nor national nor Germanic support.  This complex of 
ideas and this denial of natural theology were expressed in the first article of the Barmen 
Declaration in 1934 and declared by the Confessing Church. 
 
Third, natural theology appears to offer a second source of truth to stand ‘alongside and apart 
from the one Word of God’ (CD, 2, 1, 176) with a consequence that, where there appears to 
be a disagreement between the two, one must be right in the other must be wrong.  How is 
humanity to decide in such cases?  If natural theology is indeed a means of obtaining 
knowledge of God, then why should its conclusions be set aside in the face of the different 
conclusions of revelation?  Such a dilemma was, to Barth, intolerable and a further reason for 
holding fast only to revelation as the sole source of true knowledge of God. 
 
Yet there is in Barth also the recognition that the biblical witness contains reference to natural 
theology ‘which is regarded simply as a preparation’ (CD, 2, 1, 101).  For ‘it is not to be 
disputed that the biblical witnesses do appeal to the witness of man in the cosmos’ (CD, 2, 1, 
102).  But his conclusion is that ‘the witness of man in the cosmos does not come about 
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independently, but in utter coordination with and subordination to the witness of the speaking 
and acting of God in the people and among the men of the people of Israel’ (CD, 2, 1, 108). 
For ‘the biblical witnesses point also to man in the cosmos in order to interpret the revelation 
of God in its necessary and compulsive direction and relation to the one to whom it is 
addressed’ (CD, 2, 1, 111).  So the witness of man in the cosmos is a witness that has no 
genuine independence of the revelation of God.  It is a witness that reflects the revelation and 
action of God already taking place.  And where the revelation is revelation about human 
beings rather than about God this is in order to show how the revelation of God ought to be 
interpreted. 
 
These statements show that some of the features of human beings which might be grasped by 
other methods than revelation, for example by the methods of empirical theology, are in a 
position to illustrate the general principles found in revelation.  In the words of Torrance, 
‘Barth claims that, properly understood, natural theology is included within revealed 
theology’.16  So natural theology is not an enemy of the theology of revelation but submerged 
within it.  This is particularly apparent in Barth’s discussion of the key texts in Romans 
1.18ff.  His contention is that these texts occur within the immediate context of the 
declaration of the divine revelation (apokalupsis) of the Gospel spoken of in Romans 1.15,16.  
So those Jews and Gentiles who discern God in creation are not Jews and Gentiles in general 
but rather those who have been ‘confronted with the divine apokalupsis of the Gospel’ (CD, 
2, 1, 119).  Whatever natural theology gives to these people would not have been given had 
the Gospel been withheld. 
 
The Pauline argument in Romans 1 need not be read in the way advocated by Barth.  Dunn 
argues that ‘there is an innate rapport between the divine and the human because the divine 
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logos immanent throughout the world is immanent also in man as the power of reason’.17  
Creaturely rationality can grasp the creator’s rational creativeness, implying some form of 
natural theology. 
 
Torrance’s own account of natural theology is distinct from Barth’s.  Whereas Barth objected 
to a separate witness to God that might contradict or compromise revelation, Torrance moves 
natural theology ‘into the domain of systematic theology’ so that it can be ‘developed as a 
complex of rational structures’18 within the fabric of revealed theology.  Natural theology is 
natural in a new way because it is adapted to its proper object which is ‘God in self-revealing 
interaction with us in space and time’.19  Natural theology’s method is adapted to the physical 
conditions under which God is revealed, an adaptation characteristic of science. 
 
Furthermore, it is scientific in the sense that it is a rigorous enterprise and in the sense that it 
is enacted under the double conditions of the reality of God and the constraints of space and 
time, even if space and time are themselves, after Einstein, recognised as inter-connected.  
God’s self-revelation takes place to human beings within the world and the intelligibility of 
the world is itself part of the disclosure.  It follows that, as natural science explains and 
reconceptualises the world in new ways, so theological understanding of God’s relation to this 
world must also change.   
 
Indeed alternative natural theologies are already coming into existence, natural theologies that 
begin from a non-Christian position but which are drawn into existence by the extraordinary 
intricacies and complexity of the universe.  For example Davies ‘strays into pantheism’ on 
one side while, on the other, postulating the existence of a God who looks more like a pagan 
demiurge than the traditional Judaeo-Christian God.20  While, by contrast, Hoyle seeks to 
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provide an account of the origin of human race by reference to insemination by alien spores.  
Such variations are indicative of the possibility of constructing more than one metaphysical 
account on the basis of the same scientific view of the world.  
 
Equally supportive of empirical theology is the analogy drawn by Augustine between the 
Trinity and human beings.  Human beings, as made in the image of God, must bear a 
Trinitarian imprint.  Throughout the text of De Trinitate, Augustine draws a series of parallels 
between the nature of human beings and the nature of Trinity.  For example in book 13 there 
is in the human mind a kind of trinity since any recollection of words committed to memory 
contains both the sounds of those words and the shape of them in written form and then, when 
recollected, sound and shape are combined.  A series of analogies make the same point, and 
the point is made because Augustine presumes that God leaves vestiges of himself within 
creation, and especially within human beings.   
 
The application of empirical theology 
On the basis of the foregoing, how is empirical theology to be conceived and practised?   
 
A series of choices must be made. First, about whether theology in its entirety is an art or a 
science.  Is it hermeneutical, expressive and essentially non-realist or in some sense fixed by 
its unchanging subject matter and therefore normative, logical and epistemologically unique?  
Second, about the location of empirical theology, either as the practical and applied section 
within each of the disciplines comprising the whole field of theology or as an intermediate 
discipline utilising an empirical tool box to prepare every other theological discipline for its 
handling within practical theology.  Third, about the possible location of empirical theology 
in a special relationship with natural theology, where natural theology is located inside 
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revealed theology.  Fourth, about whether to accept without alteration the intradisciplinary 
approach advocated by Nijmegen and worked out in detail by van der Ven. Each of these 
choices has an impact on the practice of empirical theology and its practitioners need to be 
clear about where they are placing it and the criteria by which pieces of work are judged to be 
(a) empirically satisfactory and (b) theologically satisfactory. 
 
Nevertheless, however these choices are made, there appears to be no reason in principle to 
deny that social science methods may be adopted within the family of methods already at 
home within the general field of theology.  It would be absurd, for instance, to accept 
sophisticated historiography in support of historical theology while denying the best social 
science methods in support of empirical theology. 
 
Van der Ven has given a series of illustrations concerning the application of empirical 
theology.  His most detailed account concerns the relationship between concepts of God and 
of theodicy.  His exploration of this relationship made use of the steps of theological 
reflection that he recommends as well as an extremely thorough and impressive piece of 
empirical work using variables operationalised from the theological reflection.  By beginning 
and ending with theology he has attempted a contribution to theological understanding.  On 
the other hand, Kay and Francis in presenting an account of interdisciplinary work as a whole, 
have not shown exactly how the theological element of in any investigation might be related 
to the empirical phase.21  But they would accept and agree with the general notion of 
operationalisation.  In an example given by Kay variables within a church-related situation 
were tested and the theological contribution to the testing concerns the identification of which 
variables were likely to be salient.22  By taking a theological account, in this case of church 
growth, and subjecting it to empirical exploration, it was possible to discover whether the 
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theological model had any empirical reality.  Francis, in a series of studies on church schools, 
has begun with the presumed theology for establishing and maintaining these schools and 
then has tested outcomes in the lives of their pupils.23  Here also a theological model, albeit 
often tacit, was tested against empirical reality.  So interdisciplinary work of this kind has 
served to test theological assumptions rather than to contribute to new theological analyses or 
accounts.  And the reason why no attempts were made by this (British) school of empirical 
theology is that there does appear to be considerable disjunction between the tight 
methodology of empirical work and the much looser and discursive nature of theological 
discourse.  The British took the view that their testing of existing theological models largely 
spoke for itself and that, in any case, there was no obvious methodological bridge back from 
the results of empirical test to the uncertain conditions or assumptions that had first generated 
the theological model. 
 
Torrance’s discussion of natural theology does have a bearing on the functioning of empirical 
theology.  If, as argued, empirical theology has a special relationship to natural theology then 
we are likely to see natural theology influenced by the processes and concepts of the scientific 
community.  In this way traffic begins to flow from the scientific community to natural 
theology and from natural theology to empirical theology.  We may anticipate listening to and 
constructing theological explanations from probabilistic or causal mechanisms within the 
physical world, from the nature of time, from the implications of mapping the genome, from 
mind-body experimentation, from embryo research, and so on.  In this way new categories 
and concerns may arrive within theology as a field -- that is, across most of its disciplines. 
Some ideas will arrive by percolating through empirical theology and others through 
philosophy and, even, liturgy and popular culture. Torrance’s notion that natural theology can 
lead to new rational structures within systematic theology is part of this larger picture.  
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Theology itself begins to change its grand classificatory concepts and to reorganise itself to 
face the world of the third millennium.   
 
Finally, and quite different, is the apologetic task to which natural theology, and therefore 
empirical theology, may be applied.  The credibility of natural theology, the argument for the 
existence of God on the basis of the uniformities of the natural world, has fluctuated since St 
Paul, Aquinas and Paley.  It has been challenged in the 19th century and then towards the end 
of the 20th century underwent a resurgence, particularly as the complex nature of the universe 
was shown to exist not only at the macro-level but that the micro-level and in terms of the 
constants governing the original expansion from the singularity after the big bang.  This 
resurgence of natural theology based upon a consideration of the physical world may yet have 
its counterpart in respect of the social and psychological world. 
 
The social and psychological world of human beings is predicated upon the need to protect 
and nurture babies - this imperative ensures the survival of the species.  Additionally, humans 
have a prolonged period of vulnerable childhood.  Rich and early contact with other human 
beings is necessary to subsequent cognitive and emotional growth, especially in harnessing 
the communicative and ratiocinative possibilities of language and in laying down the social 
and familial bonds that prevent pathological behaviour.  Such formative experiences within 
the early stages of human life are also likely to have other purposes.  They are likely to be 
connected with faith, where faith is defined as an attitude of dependence and trust.  For this 
reason, then, empirical theology may begin to investigate the processes that give rise to 
normal human development and to argue on the basis of these processes for the existence of a 
God who put them in place.24  The design of these processes may be conducive to an 
understanding of the work of God. 
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